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Abstract 
Mass casualty decontamination is a public health intervention that would be employed by emergency 
responders following a chemical, biological, or radiological incident. The decontamination of large 
numbers of casualties is currently most often performed with water to remove contaminants from the 
skin surface.  An online survey was conducted to explore US fire departments’ decontamination 
practices, and their preparedness for responding to incidents involving mass casualty 
decontamination. 
Survey respondents were asked to provide details of various aspects of their decontamination 
procedures, including: expected response times to reach casualties, disrobing procedures, 
approaches to decontamination, characteristics of the decontamination showering process, provision 
for special populations and any actions taken following decontamination. The aim of the survey was to 
identify any differences in the way in which decontamination guidance is implemented across US 
States. 
Results revealed that in line with current guidance, many US fire departments routinely use the 
“ladder-pipe system” (LPS) for conducting rapid, gross decontamination of casualties. The survey 
revealed significant variability in LPS construction, such as the position and number of fire hoses 
used. There was also variability in decontamination characteristics, such as water temperature and 
water pressure, detergent use, and shower duration.  
The results presented in this paper provide important insights into the ways in which implementation 
of decontamination guidance can vary between US States. These inconsistencies are thought to 
reflect established ‘perceived best-practice’ and local adaptation of response plans to address 
practical and logistical constraints. These outcomes highlight the need for evidence-based, national 
guidelines for conducting mass casualty decontamination.
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Introduction 
The use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material and weapons remains a 
global threat1, 2.  Due to the adverse health consequences of chemical incidents, the US Government 
considers both deliberate and accidental release to be a serious threat to public health3, 4.  National or 
regional guidelines are in place in the US and many other countries for responding to mass casualty 
incidents arising from exposure to CBRN materials3, 5, 6. One of the main interventions for reducing 
the risk posed by CBRN agents is decontamination. The aim of decontamination is to remove as 
much contaminant from the skin as possible, in order to prevent or minimise adverse health effects, 
and to reduce the risk of secondary contamination of other people and places. Decontamination can 
involve various steps, including disrobe, a shower with water, or dry decontamination with absorbent 
materials. While decontamination may be used in response to incidents involving biological and 
radiological materials, it is likely to be of most benefit during incidents involving chemical agents, 
since this type of exposure may be overt (it is immediately obvious that a release has occurred) and 
an immediate response is necessary in order to minimise injury and save lives7. Mass 
decontamination is described as, “the emergency removal of contamination quickly from large 
numbers of victims”8.  . 
Although there are gaps in the research literature to date, evidence suggests that rapid physical 
removal of a hazardous agent is the most important aspect of decontamination1,9.  The act of 
disrobing has been shown to be a highly effective method for removing hazardous chemical 
contaminants from casualties and should be implemented at the earliest opportunity during incidents 
involving chemical agents 7, 10. For incidents involving biological and radiological materials, a “wet strip 
flush” approach may be more effective, but the current survey focuses on response to chemical 
incidents, for which disrobing prior to showering has been shown to be most effective7. It is important 
that casualties disrobe prior to showering, as failure to do so could facilitate increased transfer of any 
contaminant on to the skin7.  Disrobing should then be followed by gross decontamination, which is 
the use of standard equipment to provide a rapid yet structured decontamination process for large 
numbers of people. One recommended method for conducting gross decontamination is the Ladder-
Pipe System (LPS). LPS decontamination involves positioning ladders and hoses from two or more 
fire tenders to create a shower corridor through which contaminated casualties are moved11.  
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Guidance recommends that water in this shower corridor is delivered in high volume, but at relatively 
low pressures (see Figure 1 for an illustrative LPS corridor). Further, guidance recommends that 
instructions to casualties include the instruction to walk slowly through the corridor with their heads 
held back, arms extended and turning around in the centre of the corridor12. LPS decontamination 
may then be followed by secondary or technical decontamination in specialised mass 
decontamination units. The decision as to whether or not to carry out secondary decontamination will 
usually depend on the type and the extent of contamination12. 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
Recent research involving specialised mass decontamination units has examined how different 
characteristics of the showering process can contribute to the effectiveness of decontamination. 
Findings show that in mass decontamination units, the optimal duration for shower-based 
decontamination is between 60 and 90 seconds and the recommended water temperature for 
decontamination is 35°C (95˚F)13,14. The use of detergent removes around 40% more contamination 
that water alone7,15 and is recommended to optimise shower-based decontamination 7,12,16,17,18,19,20.  
However, while research has examined the effectiveness of different showering characteristics using 
mass decontamination units, methods of gross decontamination have not undergone formal testing. In 
the conduct of gross decontamination, current guidance recommends that a high volume of water be 
delivered at a minimum of 60 pounds per square inch (psi) (4.14 bar) to ensure that hazardous agents 
are removed11.  Weather is an environmental factor that may affect the behaviour of a toxic agent and 
will therefore impact on decontamination requirements. For example, strong wind, heavy rain, or 
temperatures below freezing may reduce the effects of a chemical agent8. Decontamination during 
cold or adverse weather may also increase the risk of hypothermia, particularly for vulnerable groups 
such as older people, young children and people with existing health conditions, and the 
decontamination process may need to be adapted accordingly; for example, implementing dry instead 
of wet decontamination and quickly providing casualties with temporary clothing and a place to 
shelter, in order to provide warmth and to address modesty concerns3, 12. 
The needs of a diverse population and in particular vulnerable groups must be considered during the 
decontamination process. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Organisation on 
Disability launched the Emergency Preparedness Initiative to ensure that emergency managers and 
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first responders address disability concerns, and that people with disabilities are included in all levels 
of emergency planning, response, and recovery17. Guidance suggests that those with disabilities be 
allowed to retain any equipment which enables them to maintain independence and self-control3.  
Further, recent research has suggested that emergency responders can look to casualties to support 
each other to take key actions such as moving away from the source of contamination and initiating 
self-care decontamination procedures, helping those around them to do the same22.  An effective 
communication strategy is needed to convey the importance of these steps as emergency responders 
help to manage contaminated casualties23,24. Guidance states that it may be challenging to 
communicate decontamination procedures with casualties who are Non-English speaking (NES) or 
Limited English Proficiency (LEP)19,20,25. Research suggests individuals who are NES/LEP are unlikely 
to follow instructions during a mass casualty event, possibly because they may have lower confidence 
in the communication they receive regarding appropriate actions to take26. Guidance recommends the 
inclusion of interpreters in the decontamination team, and for emergency responders to be fully 
trained in order to assist those who are NES and LEP20,25. 
This study explored decontamination practices and preparedness for chemical incidents in US fire 
departments via an online survey, in order to explore regional variations and consistency with current 
evidence and guidance for mass casualty decontamination. Survey questions related to: the response 
time to reach contaminated casualties, approaches to disrobing, the characteristics of the 
decontamination showering process, provision for vulnerable groups, and the management of 
casualties post-decontamination (See Supplementary File 1 for full survey). The study informed an 
on-going collaborative research programme conducted by University of Hertfordshire and Public 
Health England on behalf of Health and Human Services’ Biomedical Advances Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA), which seeks to develop the evidence-base for effective emergency 
decontamination procedures. 
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Methods 
Survey design 
A 31 question online survey was created by researchers at Public Health England (PHE) and the 
University of Hertfordshire (UH).  The survey was conducted using SelectSurvey.Net, hosted on PHE 
servers in the UK. This allowed data to be stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 
1998.  As the survey was designed to capture information about current emergency decontamination 
practices, the survey was considered a form of service evaluation, and therefore not subject to 
research ethics approval.  This position was confirmed by the PHE Research and Development 
Office. 
Survey questions were designed to ensure clarity, brevity and avoid ambiguity to meet good practice 
in survey design. A combination of closed questions, multiple response, and open-ended response 
options were used to address a range of questions. Multiple response option questions were 
presented in a grid format, with the order of questions randomised within each grid to prevent 
response item ordering bias. Page conditions were used so that if, for example, a respondent 
reported that casualties would not be disrobed prior to decontamination, they would be directed to a 
subsequent set of questions and would not have to answer questions about pre-decontamination 
disrobing. Respondents were able to skip questions if they had insufficient information to respond. 
Survey respondents were asked to report their level of experience concerning mass decontamination, 
including: whether they had ever been involved in a CBRN incident, the number of real-life incidents 
they had been involved in and the occurrence/ frequency of emergency preparedness drills and 
exercises in their locality. Three questions were asked to identify: the decontamination approach used 
by their fire department, the hose configurations they would use for Ladder-Pipe System 
decontamination, and the procedures they would use during cold weather. Two questions addressed 
the act of disrobing casualties during an incident response. The survey asked five specific questions 
about the decontamination showering process, which related to: the temperature of the water, the 
water pressure (in psi) the duration of showering, whether detergent would be routinely added to 
shower water and whether casualties would walk through the decontamination corridor alone or in 
groups. Further questions in the survey sought to collect data in key areas including: the response 
time to reach contaminated casualties and the provision for vulnerable populations during mass 
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decontamination.  The full set of survey questions can be seen in the supplementary File 1 
accompanying this article. 
 
Participants and procedure 
A covering letter with a link to the online survey was circulated to members of the US InterAgency 
Board (IAB). The IAB is, “…a voluntary collaborative panel of emergency preparedness and response 
practitioners from a wide array of professional disciplines that represent all levels of government and 
the voluntary sector”27. The covering letter explained the purpose of the study and invited recipients to 
take part in the survey.  Additional emergency responders were identified using snowball sampling; a 
non-probability sampling technique where respondents are asked to assist researchers in identifying 
other potential participants.  The covering letter and survey link requested that IAB members circulate 
the survey to other colleagues among the emergency response community. Respondents were 
provided with PHE contact details should they have any further questions about the survey. Informed 
consent from survey respondents was collected via a question on the first screen of the survey, 
following an introduction to the aims of the survey, the time commitment involved and information on 
the way in which respondents’ information would be processed and stored. 
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Results 
The survey elicited a relatively low sample size. A total of 68 emergency response professionals 
responded to the survey, however only 42 completed the survey, with 26 skipping one or more 
questions.  Of the 68 participants, 49 identified their location (see Figure 2) with at least one response 
coming from each of 21 different US States. Thirty four participants identified the city to which their 
fire department was located; according the 2010 US Census28, 31 of these cities are classified as an 
urban area (≥ 50,000 people), whilst 3 are classified as an urban cluster area (at least 2,500 and less 
than 50,000 people). Fifty two survey respondents disclosed their emergency response role, with 
responses indicating varying levels of experience in emergency preparedness and response. Eleven 
respondents indicated that they were directly involved in decontamination, CBRN, and/or hazmat at 
an operational level. Two respondents reported that they were responsible for producing guidance on 
the subject. Almost half of the respondents who completed the survey (n = 23) held leadership 
positions at the senior level, such as Director or Chief. Overall, respondent’s job roles indicated that 
they were well qualified to describe the emergency response procedures in their locality. 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
 
Response time to contaminated casualties 
Twenty five respondents estimated the time between receiving a 911 call and the arrival of fire 
tenders at the incident scene. The estimated response times during peak traffic ranged from 3 to 
15mins (Mean response time (M) = 8.01mins), while the estimated response times during non-peak 
traffic ranged from 3 to 12mins (M = 5.36 mins). Twenty respondents estimated the time between 
arrival of fire tenders at the scene and the start of emergency decontamination. The estimated time 
between arrival of fire engines and decontamination of the first casualty ranged from 20 seconds to 20 
minutes (M = 5.65 minutes), with five of 20 respondents providing estimates of 2 minutes or less.  
Twenty eight respondents estimated the time allowed between disrobing and beginning emergency 
decontamination, with times ranging from 0 - 60 minutes (M = 6.29 minutes).  
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Removal of contaminated clothing 
The majority of respondents (64%) reported that in a real incident involving a chemical contaminant, 
casualties would be instructed to disrobe prior to showering (see Figure 3). Respondents were asked 
to specify at what point during the decontamination process they would ask casualties to disrobe. This 
open-ended question revealed that nearly half of the respondents (13/28) said that casualties would 
be asked to disrobe immediately. Other responses included: “response would be situation/incident 
dependent” (n = 11); “casualties would be instructed to disrobe after gross decontamination” (n = 3); 
and “unsure” (n = 1).  
Respondents were asked what they would do if casualties were unwilling to disrobe. The question 
allowed respondents to select more than one option from several strategies; responses are presented 
in Table 1. The most commonly selected procedure (n = 18) was to “offer a privacy corridor”. The 7 
respondents who selected “Other” were asked to specify the alternative strategies they would use, 
with responses including: “several of the above”; “situational”, and “separated into a different refuge 
area (control until decontamination can be metered or quality assurance measures are verified)”.  
Insert Figure 3 here. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
Methods of decontamination 
Thirty-six of 51 respondents confirmed the Ladder-Pipe System (LPS) is the preferred approach for 
decontaminating multiple casualties affected by a chemical incident. A number of different or 
additional approaches were reported including: “technical decontamination”, “reactive skin 
decontamination lotion (RSDL)”, “multiple decontamination shower tents”, and “outdoor plumbing and 
fixtures around military hospitals to quickly set up mass decontamination lines for community and 
military support”. 
 
Characteristics of the LPS decontamination 
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Respondents were asked to describe the hose and nozzle arrangement employed during LPS 
decontamination and to provide details about water temperature and pressure used, shower duration, 
and instructions provided to affected casualties. Twenty five of the 36 respondents who used the LPS 
approach answered these questions. 
 
Configuration of hoses/nozzles 
Respondents were asked to specify the configuration of hoses and nozzles they would use to carry 
out LPS. The questions in this section allowed respondents to select more than one option from 
several strategies. The most common response reported by 19 of the 25 respondents was the use of 
three positions; hoses mounted to fire tenders either side of the decontamination corridor and 
overhead hoses. Two respondents indicated that only side mounted hoses were used whilst 7 
respondents stated that some other configuration was used.  Respondents reported a variety of 
different brands and types of shower nozzles used at each hose position including Turbo Master, Hy-
D, Akron Fog Nozzles, and Task Force Tips. 
 
Control of water temperature 
The majority of the respondents (20/25; 80%) said they were unable to control the temperature of the 
shower water. Only 3 respondents (12%) stated that temperature control was possible (see Figure 4). 
The respondents who said they were unable to control the water temperature were asked the 
approximate hydrant temperature on the coldest and hottest days of the year. Ten respondents 
estimated the hydrant temperature on the coldest and hottest days of the year, with temperatures 
ranging from 30 - 76°F (-1.1 – 24.4˚C) for the coldest day, and 50 - 79°F (10 – 26.1˚C) for the hottest 
day.  
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Water pressure 
The respondents were asked to estimate the water pressure used to decontaminate casualties. Ten 
of 25 respondents estimated the water pressure used, with responses ranging from 30 to 150 psi (M = 
66 psi) (2.07 – 10.3 bar (M = 4.6 bar)). Factors influencing decisions about water pressure included 
satisfactory spray pattern, corridor length and adequate ‘fog’. Nine respondents did not know the 
water pressure used for decontamination.  
 
Shower duration 
The respondents were asked to specify how long they would let casualties spend in the shower. 
Twenty of the 25 respondents (80%) gave numerical estimations of the duration of decontamination, 
ranging from 5-10 seconds to 10 minutes, with half of the respondents stating that shower duration 
would be between 30 and 60 seconds (10/20; 50%). A further 4 respondents (20%) stated that 
shower duration would be 2 minutes; 3 respondents (15%) greater than 5 minutes (5 – 10 minutes), 
and 3 respondents (15%) stated that shower duration would be less than 30 seconds (5 – 20 secs).  
 
Detergent use 
Ten out of 25 respondents (40%) stated that they were unable to add detergent to the water 
dispensed from the fire hoses during Ladder-Pipe decontamination. A comparable 11 respondents 
(44%) said that they were able to carry out this process. Four respondents (16%) selected ‘Don’t 
know’ (see Figure 5).  Follow up questions explored the type and concentration of detergents, if used. 
Only 3 respondents referenced specific brands (Dawn, n = 2, Johnson’ Baby Shampoo, n = 1), while 
4 respondents provided generic information such as ‘Class A foams’ and ‘dish soap’. No indication of 
the concentration of detergent used was provided. 
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Cold weather considerations 
Eleven of 25 respondents confirmed that they would employ LPS decontamination, even under cold 
weather conditions.  Fifteen of 25 respondents identified other measures including: “using tents with 
warm air and a warm water supply”; “dry decontamination”; “providing protection from the cold 
environment”, and “using nearby facilities such as nearby building lobbies”. 
 
Management of casualties through the decontamination process 
Nineteen of 25 respondents (76%) reported that they have no fixed rules for how casualties would 
walk through the shower corridor. Five respondents (20%) reported that casualties would walk 
through the shower individually, and one respondent (4%) reported that they didn’t know whether 
casualties would be asked to walk through the process individually or in groups.  Eight out of 25 
respondents (32%) reported that they would use a bull horn or other type of PA system to direct 
casualties through the decontamination process. Seven respondents (28%) gave details of the 
instructions which they would provide to casualties during the decontamination process. The most 
commonly reported instructions included: asking casualties to walk slowly through the 
decontamination corridor; extend arms, and turn occasionally. 
 
Provision for vulnerable groups 
Survey respondents were asked to elaborate their procedures for managing casualties with additional 
or special needs during mass decontamination, specifically during disrobe and rerobe. Groups who 
may have special needs during decontamination, include those with mental or physical health 
conditions, children, non-ambulatory casualties and those who require supportive aids such as 
wheelchairs, prosthetic limbs and assistance animals. Respondents were asked how they would 
manage groups who are unable to undress/redress themselves due to physical and/or mental health 
conditions (see Table 2). The most commonly selected approach was, ‘have a member of their team 
disrobe them and rerobe them at the other end’ (n = 21). Those who selected ‘Other’ (n = 8) were 
asked to specify the approach they used. Responses included: “depends on the situation”, “any of the 
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above may be applicable”, “male and female hazardous materials technicians are available inside the 
decontamination tent to assist”, and “generate a by-pass lane / privacy corridor and/or tarp the tent 
interior to create support space”. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
Respondents were asked if parents/guardians were allowed to carry young children through the 
decontamination shower. Of 48 responses to this question, 41 respondents stated that parents would 
be allowed to carry young children through decontamination, with only 2 respondents suggesting that 
this is not permitted. In addition, respondents were asked to identify their procedures for the 
management of casualties who are unable to walk (non-ambulatory) during decontamination (see 
Table 3). The most common option was, ‘allocate a designated decontamination area and crew 
specifically to deal with non-ambulatory casualties’ (n = 34). ‘Other’ responses included: “dependent 
on agent”; “level of exposure”; “onset of symptoms”; “available staff”; “number of casualties requiring 
decontamination”; “ask victims to assist and provide extra time in the decontamination shower area 
for the group to reduce contamination as much as possible for all involved”, and “assist non-
ambulatory casualties with responders in PPE”.  When asked if they would allow those with physical 
impairments to take supportive aids through the decontamination procedure, the majority of 
respondents indicated that guide dogs (74%), walking sticks (79%), wheelchairs (74%), prosthetic 
limbs (79%) and glasses (84%) were all permitted to pass through decontamination with casualties. 
Insert Table 3 here. 
 
Post-decontamination care 
The majority of respondents (22/28; 79%) would provide temporary clothing packs to casualties 
following emergency decontamination. Only 4 respondents (14%) said ‘no’, while the remaining 2 
respondents (7%) said they did not know. When asked whether the emergency department of a local 
hospital would be prepared to accept casualties who had only undergone LPS decontamination, 16 of 
25 respondents (64%) answered ‘yes’. However, 7 respondents (28%) said the emergency 
department would be prepared to accept casualties, ‘only after more thorough/technical 
decontamination’. Two respondents (8%) said they did not know.
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Discussion 
The online survey presented in this paper describes a cross-section of current decontamination 
practices and preparedness for chemical incidents across 21 different US States. Responses to the 
survey indicate that decontamination practices differ substantially, suggesting that current protocols 
are not always consistent with current evidence and best-practice guidance. The survey focused on a 
number of different aspects of mass decontamination: response time to reach contaminated 
casualties; approaches to disrobing and decontamination; characteristics of the decontamination 
showering process and provision for special populations.  These topics will be discussed here. 
 
Response time to reach contaminated casualties 
All respondents reported that they would reach contaminated casualties within 15 minutes of receiving 
a 911 call, and that response times could be as little as 3 minutes. However, there was wide variability 
in the length of time between fire tenders arriving at the scene and the first casualty being 
decontaminated, with estimations ranging between 20 seconds and 20 minutes. This emphasises the 
need to quickly initiate disrobing of casualties, as this is an effective step which can be taken soon 
after emergency responders arrive at the incident scene  7. It may be that the respondents assumed 
that the decision to decontaminate would already have been made in this scenario, and may also 
have made the assumption that initial decontamination could be conducted with on vehicle water 
reservoirs and hoses, rather than with a full LPS configuration in place. However, this is speculative, 
so we acknowledge that these times might be unrealistic, and further investigation is required. 
 
Approaches to disrobing and decontamination 
Most of the respondents stated that they would ask casualties to disrobe prior to showering, with just 
over half stating that they would ask casualties to disrobe as soon as possible. However, a proportion 
of respondents stated that they would not ask casualties to disrobe prior to showering. Disrobing has 
been shown to be one of the most effective steps to reduce exposure to a contaminant and to 
maximise this protective effect, disrobing should occur as soon as possible following potential 
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contamination10. While a large number of respondents acknowledged the importance of rapid 
disrobing, this was not universally recognised.  
When asked what actions they would take if casualties were unwilling to disrobe, most respondents 
stated that they would either offer a privacy corridor or provide further explanation about the benefits 
of disrobing (or both). However, half of the respondents stated that they would allow casualties to 
proceed through the decontamination process fully clothed. Allowing casualties to undergo 
decontamination whilst fully clothed could increase the transfer of contaminants through the clothing, 
leading to greater contamination of the skin7. 
The majority of respondents stated that they would employ the LPS method of decontamination, as 
recommended in current guidance 3,11, 12.  The most common hose configuration for LPS was to use 
hoses mounted to the side of fire tenders, as well as a hose suspended from a ladder attached to an 
aerial truck. The type of nozzle attachments generating the shower spray was shown to vary amongst 
respondents with no clear indication of preferred models or spray pattern. The majority of respondents 
recognised that it might be necessary to adapt LPS decontamination systems during cold weather, 
with suggested adaptations including using tents with warm air and warm water, or carrying out dry 
decontamination instead. However, some respondents stated that they would carry out the same 
method of decontamination during cold or adverse weather. Current guidance suggests that in cold 
environments, it might be necessary to avoid water-based decontamination, to minimise the likelihood 
of cold weather injuries3. This is particularly the case when decontaminating vulnerable groups, such 
as older adults or children, who are at increased risk of adverse effects from the cold.  
 
Characteristics of the decontamination showering process 
The majority of respondents stated that they were unable to control the temperature of the water used 
for decontamination. There were a wide range of different water pressures reportedly used for 
decontamination but over half of the respondents were unclear as to the pressure employed. 
Approximately a quarter of respondents stated that the pressure they would use would be around or 
below 60 psi (4.14 bar), the minimum recommended water pressure for decontamination11. The 
majority of participants (14 of 25) were either unable to add detergent to the water dispensed from fire 
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hoses, or did not know if this was possible, and were therefore unable to follow the recommendation 
of decontaminating casualties using detergent16,17,18,19,20. Only 3 respondents made reference to 
specific brands of detergent appropriate for the decontamination of casualties, and no indication of the 
concentration of detergent used was provided. Respondents reported a wide range in shower 
duration, ranging from 5 seconds to 10 minutes. Half of respondents reported that shower duration 
would be between 30 and 60 seconds, below the recommended shower duration of 60 and 90 
seconds identified in controlled studies of emergency decontamination13, 14. 
Only a quarter of respondents reported that they would provide instructions to casualties about how to 
progress through the decontamination process. Where details of specific instructions were given, 
these included asking participants to walk slowly through the decontamination corridor, turn 
occasionally, and extend arms; these instructions were therefore broadly in-line with current guidance, 
based on perceived best practice12.  However, research into effectiveness of showering in mass 
decontamination units suggests that active washing will be important14. 
 
Provision for vulnerable populations 
When asked how they would manage the decontamination of casualties who were unable to 
undress/re-dress themselves due to physical or mental health conditions, the majority of respondents 
stated that they would ask a member of their team to help the casualty to disrobe and rerobe. This 
was the most common way to manage non-ambulant casualties through the decontamination 
process. However, depending on the number of casualties with additional needs, these actions could 
put strain on responder resources, and may not be practical. Another option selected by respondents 
was to ask an able-bodied casualty to assist other casualties during disrobe and rerobe.  Recent 
research suggests that casualties may be willing to help others during decontamination, provided they 
have received practical, health-focused information from emergency responders concerning the 
importance of undergoing decontamination22,23,24.. Guidance states that the decontamination team 
should include interpreters in order to assist casualties who are NES or LEP 20,25. The survey did not 
ask questions specifically related to communication with non-English speaking casualties; further 
work is needed to explore the management of this vulnerable group during mass decontamination. 
The survey questions relating to vulnerable groups also did not distinguish between casualties who 
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were non-ambulant due to pre-existing conditions, and casualties who had become non-ambulant as 
a result of the incident. It is likely that emergency responders might choose to manage these two 
groups differently, and this is therefore an aspect which requires further study. 
The majority of respondents stated that they would allow various different types of service equipment, 
including guide dogs, walking sticks, wheelchairs, prosthetic limbs and glasses to be taken through 
the decontamination shower; this is in-line with recommendations in decontamination guidance3.  Only 
a small minority stated that they would not allow this equipment to go through the decontamination 
shower. Whilst allowing service equipment to be taken through the shower is likely to enable 
casualties to progress through decontamination more independently, consideration should be given to 
equipment which cannot go through the showering process (e.g. some types of prosthetic limbs). In 
such cases, casualties should be decontaminated as non-ambulant casualties3.  
 
Implications 
Reported decontamination procedures varied substantially between different survey respondents. In 
certain aspects, such as initiating disrobe as quickly as possible, employing an LPS method of 
decontamination, and provision of rerobe packs to casualties following decontamination, responses 
were broadly in-line with guidance and evidence for decontamination practices. However, in several 
aspects of decontamination, most notably characteristics of the decontamination shower (shower 
duration, shower temperature, and shower pressure), responses varied and were often not consistent 
with current guidance. Failure to adhere to recommended decontamination processes could result in 
casualties receiving less than effective decontamination, and possibly experiencing more adverse 
effects or injury. The variability in the responses presented here may be a result of the fact that there 
are several national guidance documents for mass decontamination, which are not always consistent 
with each other. Some of these guidance documents are based on evidence from research, while 
others are based on perceived best practice. The findings from the survey reported here therefore 
suggest that there is a need to ensure that decontamination guidance documents are consistent 
across US States, and updated routinely with the developing evidence-base in this area. 
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Study limitations 
There are two main limitations to this study.  First, snowball sampling was used to reach respondents; 
this method is dependent on participants forwarding the survey on to others. The population of 
interest was emergency response personnel with either experience of or training in the management 
of CBRN incidents; such responders are likely to have busy and demanding roles, which may have 
impacted their ability and willingness to complete the survey. However, the variability in response in a 
relatively small sample could be indicative of wider variability in decontamination practices, or at least 
variability within the bounds of the responses of the current sample, emphasising the need for 
evidence-based, national-level guidance. A second limitation is that the survey is based on self-report 
data. While we acknowledge that self-reported data can be biased, this represents the most efficient 
method to capture responder experiences and understanding of decontamination methods. Whilst the 
responses may be subject to some bias, it is likely the responses reflect ‘perceived best-practice’ and 
local adaptation of response plans to address practical and logistical constraints. 
 
 
Future work 
There is currently no standard procedure for carrying out gross decontamination, and this is reflected 
in the fact that responses varied so much between participants. Future work is needed to identify 
optimum procedures for carrying out gross decontamination. Guidance should then be updated and 
standardised based on evidence from research, rather than relying on perceived best practice. 
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Table 1. If casualties are unwilling to disrobe, how would you respond? NB. Respondents 
could select as many options as applicable. 
 
  
Procedure No. of times selected 
Allow casualties to proceed through the 
decontamination procedure fully clothed 
14 
Refuse to decontaminate until they 
disrobe 
1 
Explain the importance of disrobing in 
order to encourage them to disrobe 
15 
Offer a ‘privacy corridor’ 18 
Other* 7 
* See text for ‘Other’ strategies.  
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Table 2.  How do you manage groups who are unable to undress/redress themselves due to 
physical and/or mental health conditions?  NB. Respondents could select as many options 
as applicable. 
 
Procedure No. of times selected 
Allow them to proceed through the 
decontamination procedure fully clothed 
11 
Have a member of your team disrobe 
them and re-robe them at the other end 
21 
Request help from an able-bodied 
casualty to assist with the disrobe 
process 
12 
Other* 8 
* See text for ‘Other’ strategies.  
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Table 3.  What would you do if presented with casualties who are unable to walk (non-
ambulatory) during the decontamination procedure?  NB. Respondents could select as many 
options as applicable. 
 
Procedure No. of times selected 
Prioritize the decontamination of 
ambulatory over non-ambulatory 
casualties 
12 
Allocate a designated decontamination 
area and crew specifically to deal with 
non-ambulatory casualties 
34 
Send non-ambulatory casualties to 
hospital without decontamination 
2 
Other* 11 
* See text for ‘Other’ strategies.  
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Figure 1: Image of a typical Ladder-Pipe System (LPS) decontamination corridor 
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Figure 2: Locations of emergency response professionals who responded to the survey. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of responders who would ask casualties to disrobe prior to showering. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of responders who stated that they would be able to control the temperature 
of the shower water. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of responders who stated that they would be able to add detergent during 
decontamination.  
 
